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ABSTRACT 
Small states are often perceived to be particularly suited to take on the role of 
mediators and facilitators in international disputes. The case of Austria is peculiar in 
this regard insofar as the emergence of a ‘typical’ small state attitude in international 
affairs indeed coincided with the establishment of the country as a small nation in 
1945. Throughout the Cold War, Austria developed an active and value-based foreign 
policy which heavily emphasized international law. Austrian political leaders, 
foremost the Social Democrat Bruno Kreisky, established a global reputation for their 
country as a benevolent mediator, for example in the Middle East. This attitude has 
been intrinsically linked to the country’s neutral status, which has been formally 
preserved until today but has lost much of its substance and practical importance. This 
paper discusses the historical and normative foundations of Austria’s small state 
identity and asks whether the glorious reputation of the past has been preserved. The 
paper argues that European and transatlantic integration as well as a number of 
domestic factors have substantially diminished Austria’s role as a ‘natural born’ 
peacemaker on the global stage. 
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Introduction 
Austria is frequently portrayed as a ‘typical’ small state along with, for example, 
Sweden, Finland and Ireland – both within the European Union (EU) and in the wider 
context of international relations. The title of this article refers to the idea of Austrian 
philosopher Leopold Kohr (1909-1994) that greatness was an inherent weakness in 
states rather than an indicator of their power and superiority over others. While his 
theory referred more specifically to the societal and economic problems caused by 
rapid and unlimited growth, his writings also suggested that small states had a greater 
normative capacity and a greater potential to take adequate policy decisions, to pursue 
“global pluralistic cooperation” and enjoy “largely unaffiliated self-sufficiency” 
(Kohr 1995: 15). By looking at the way Austrian foreign policy discourse has 
developed over time, this article seeks to explore in what way Austria tried to play 
this role of a small and unaffiliated state, and whether any such imagery accurately 
describes contemporary Austria, particularly in view of the country’s involvement in 
transatlantic and EU security and defence arrangements. Within the context of this 
special issue, this includes the question whether Austria is a natural peace-maker, a 
country with a special disposition towards peaceful means in international relations 
and with a distinct commitment towards the principles of international law. 
Oliver Rathkolb (2010: 3), a widely published and renowned Austrian historian, once 
referred to post-war Austria as the “paradoxical republic” that had spent most of its 
time being “self-absorbed” and “self-obsessed” regardless of its actual international 
perception. For him, Austrian identity up until the end of the Cold War was based on 
an “overestimation of the Austrian question [i.e. Austrian independence after 1945], 
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combined with an unvoiced bad conscience [related to its role in the Second World 
War] that continues to this day, very much as a national solipsism mediated through 
and strengthened by the Austrian press.” In line with Holsti (1970), Rathkolb points to 
the importance of national role conception and the issue of identity construction. 
As this study will show, Austrian foreign policy during the Cold War was based on 
visions and ideas that were neither naturally given nor solely induced by external 
factors. Rather it has been Austrian political leaders, foremost the Social Democrat 
Bruno Kreisky, who actively established a myth around Austria’s ‘third way’ as a 
neutral country. They promoted Austria’s purported normative and moral superiority 
as an asset in the international sphere, which at the time was dominated by high 
politics and a conventional balance of power. During the Cold War, Austria 
developed an active and value-based foreign policy which heavily emphasized 
international law. This helped to construct a global reputation for Austria as a 
benevolent mediator, for example in the context of the Middle East peace process. 
However, this was not so much because Austria had any sort of natural disposition to 
play such a role in international relations. Rather, the role conception as a peacemaker 
seemed to serve national interests at the time, while also helping the country to cope 
with the systemic constraints that the Cold War entailed. 
Today, Austria is a compliant and inconspicuous post-neutral state whose foreign 
policy is largely embedded in the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). Austria’s Security Strategy of 2011 (Österreichische 
Sicherheitsstrategie 2011) reads very much like a German version of the European 
Security Strategy (ESS) both in terms of its threat assessment and the perceived 
political and strategic implications. Austria’s neutrality policy, which for decades had 
been the core of Austria’s foreign policy, has lost much of its substance and practical 
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relevance. The reason for this was not only because global circumstances have 
changed after the end of the Cold War. Throughout the past two decades, Austrian 
leaders have taken proactive and deliberate steps at reducing the normative 
significance of neutrality, limiting it to its military core, i.e. the abstention from 
joining military alliances and from allowing foreign forces to be stationed on Austrian 
territory. This paradigmatic shift gradually undermined Austria’s special status as an 
international mediator. Although Austria is still not a member of NATO it no longer 
stands for a ‘third way’ in international relations. 
This article first discusses various theoretical approaches to small state foreign policy 
and the way they contribute to our understanding of Austrian peace policy. It then 
turns to the development of Austrian foreign policy during the Cold War, after 
Austrian accession to the EU and in the years following the conservative turn in 1999. 
The article concludes by looking at the most recent developments in Austrian foreign 
policy and the way these have changed Austria’s potential role as a peacemaker. 
Small State Austria: Smallness as Fate or Asset? 
Small states have been discussed in the literature as having a distinct approach to 
foreign policy. In the specific context of the Cold War, small state foreign and 
security policy was seen as being determined by the struggle for physical survival in 
the context of systemic confrontation between blocks (see Rothstein 1968; Keohane 
1969). While this perspective focused on asymmetries in the international system and 
dilemmas resulting for small states, other studies (e.g. Hey 2003) put more emphasis 
on small state behaviour, including specific coping strategies. Some authors (e.g. 
Inbar and Sheffer 1997; Bauwens, Clesse and Knudsen 1996; Wivel 2005) have 
suggested that the awareness of states of their relative size and political and military 
leverage at the global stage has an impact on the way these countries pursue their 
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foreign policy interests. There is no consensus in the literature as to what exactly 
constitutes ‘typical’ small state foreign policy along these lines, but Hey (2003) 
identified the following features in small state foreign policy that are commonly 
discussed in the literature: (1) a focus on a limited number of core areas in foreign 
policy (e.g. nuclear non-proliferation, peace-building); (2) a pre-occupation with 
securing the immediate geographical neighbourhood; (3) a commitment towards 
diplomatic and non-coercive measures; (4) an emphasis on international law and 
normative principles; (5) a preference for multilateral arrangements and international 
organizations; (6) and an exceptional readiness to contribute to conflict management 
and peacemaking. 
Moreover, one of the most common elements of small state foreign policy, 
particularly during the Cold War, was the adoption of neutrality (see e.g. Goetschel 
1999), i.e. a status that would keep these states out of military conflicts and other 
forms of power politics. By adopting neutrality as a foreign policy principle, small 
states like Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland sought to compensate their 
relative power deficit. Instead, they protected their territorial integrity and sovereignty 
by political and ideological means (Katzenstein 1996).  
The adoption of neutrality, and more generally, of a small state foreign policy, 
however, has never just been a matter of small states reacting to the specific 
challenges they face as weak actors in a global system dominated by great powers. 
Small state foreign policy has also been conditioned by the construction of a specific 
national identity, which built on the overall awareness of material and structural 
weakness but also emphasized the promotion of norms and values as a contribution to 
world order. The result was an approach that went beyond the mere issue of size and 
relative power gains.  
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Many studies on small state foreign policy focus on the way national identities have 
been constructed around values and ideas that enhanced and perpetuated typical small 
state foreign policy principles like neutrality or mediation. Constructivism generally 
suggests that any political situation or action has to be interpreted against the 
background of norms, values and ideas. The ideational and normative context shapes 
agency in any given situation in International Relations. Critical constructivists like 
De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999: 5) put emphasis on political discourse and argue 
that national identities are discursively “produced, reproduced, transformed and 
destructed”, i.e. they are spoken into existence. Based on a set of related emotional 
attitudes and similar behavioural dispositions they are then “internalized through 
national socialization”. Along these lines, small state identity can be understood as 
having emerged from a discourse that is informed by perceived smallness but driven 
by certain political objectives. It becomes part of the mindset of political leaders and 
the population, and combined with values and other elements of national identity. 
This small state identity then translates into a national role conception that shapes the 
state’s international standing.  
One strand in small state theory underlines that the construction of identity and role 
conceptions can be used by small states as a strategy to introduce “alternative models 
of engagement” (Ingebritsen 2002: 11). The analytical focus is not on the constraints 
of Realpolitik but on the discursive construction of alternatives. Thus, taking a strong 
stance on normative matters and international diplomacy, such as mediation and 
conflict prevention, enables small states to move the international discourse away 
from power politics, and find alternative arenas of engagement. During the Cold War, 
adopting foreign and security political profiles that differed from the logic of power 
politics as it dominated international relations at the time was a viable strategy for 
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small states like Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. It allowed them to 
compensate their relative lack of conventional political but also military leverage. 
Building on the work of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Ingebritsen (2002: 12-13) 
introduced the concept of small states as ‘norm entrepreneurs’, arguing that 
international norms have not just “been perpetuated and enforced by those with a 
preponderance of power” but that they also “originate in a group of states that share 
distinct ideas about appropriate forms of domestic and international intervention (12-
13).” Thus, small and neutral states in Europe have not only found a way to protect 
their most vital foreign policy interests, they have also played a crucial role in 
international norm diffusion, influencing global developments and the way the 
international community deals with contentious issues. 
Against this background, this article seeks a middle ground between realist and 
constructivist assumptions. According to a realist perspective small state foreign 
policy is conditioned by relative limitations in size and resources (e.g. Jervis 1978; 
Wivel 2005). This includes the contention that the idealistic and peace-oriented 
ideology often barely results from the awareness of this relative smallness (Hey 2006; 
Goetschel 1998). The constructivist assumption in turn is that small state leaders have 
deliberately constructed national role conceptions that would benefit their countries 
beyond the mere compensation of material weaknesses. The idea of seeking a 
common ground also resonates in Goetschel’s work (2011) as he contends that small 
states can act as “brokers” for certain ideas and normative visions. He thus combines 
interest-based arguments with a constructivist perspective. 
This article holds that the emergence of any sort of small state approach is based on 
material circumstances and their realist implications but also on the way these are 
perceived, interpreted and managed by political leaders and their respective societies. 
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In other words, whether or not a state adopts a small state foreign policy approach is 
both a matter of realist choices, and of the construction and internalisation of an 
ideational framework that serves specific small state interests.  
This article is not going to establish whether or not Austrian leaders deliberately 
sought to create a small state identity with the purpose of undermining conventional 
power politics. It will also not seek to find evidence for Rathkolb’s (2010) contention 
about a “self-obsessed” and “self-absorbed republic”. Rather, the article will discuss 
the way floury rhetorics about a ‘third way’, about the pre-emptive effect of neutrality 
during peace times (“Vorwirkung der Neutralität zu Friedenszeiten”) and active 
neutrality policy (“aktive Neutralitätspolitik”), have played a powerful role in 
establishing a distinct international profile for the country during the Cold War. What 
is peculiar about the Austrian case is that elites and national media took the idea of 
smallness and relative weakness to construct a sort of national myth that became 
engrained in Austrian national identity – they turned material inferiority into an asset,  
“beautiful” in the words of Kohr. 
 
Austria’s Role as a Peacemaker During the Cold War 
Austrian Neutrality: Peacemaker by Choice or by Fate? 
The concept of a “peace policy” (“Friedenspolitik”) has never dominated the foreign 
policy discourse in Austria. Political leaders have, however, routinely emphasized 
Austria’s disposition to play a distinct role in international affairs both as a mediator 
and a moral great power. These arguments essentially built on the policy of military 
non-alignment and neutrality, which Austria pursued since the inception of the 
Second Republic in 1955. In the course of the Cold War, Austrian neutrality 
developed into much more than an international legal status: it was to become the 
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centrepiece of a distinct Austrian national identity and national role concept (Pelinka 
1993). The extent to which neutrality is a defining part for Austria as a nation is not 
least expressed in the fact that the national holiday is not the day Austria regained its 
independence (27 April 1945), nor the day the Second Republic was created (15 May 
1955). It is the 26 October in commemoration of the adoption of the federal neutrality 
act (Neutralitätsgesetz) in 1955. 
The idea of establishing a neutral status for Austria emerged in the very context of the 
country being turned into a small state after decades at the heart of a multi-national 
power block, the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918). There is obviously a direct 
link between the country loosing its great power status and the interest to keep it 
outside of high politics and hard power issues. However, just as becoming a small 
state had not been a deliberate choice by Austrian leaders at the time, adopting a 
neutral status for the country was also not a free decision based on any sort of 
ideological conviction. The following section will look more closely into the specific 
context of the Austrian adoption of neutrality. Against this, it then analyses the 
development of Austrian peace policy during the Cold War and after 1989.  
Similar to the case of Finland and unlike the case of Switzerland and Sweden, 
Austria’s adoption of neutrality is recent, as it started in the context of the 
international post-Second World War order. The Republic of Austria was declared 
permanently neutral (“immerwährend neutral”) in 1955, after the territory had been 
occupied by allied forces since the end of the Second World War. There is evidence 
(Suppan 1996: 171), however, that political leaders such as then Minister-President 
Heinrich Lammasch, catholic conservative, had envisaged neutrality even for the First 
Republic, which was installed in 1919. Exponents of both the Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs – SPÖ) and the conservative Austrian 
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People’s Party (Christlichsoziale Partei) at the time considered this option for Austria 
in order to guarantee its independence and autonomy after the disintegration of the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire. They only abandoned the idea of a formal declaration of 
neutrality as Austria was granted an international loan under the supervision of the 
League of Nations, and macro-economic conditions put the country into a state of de 
facto neutrality until 1933. The discourse in Austria then started to be dominated by 
the issue of joining Nazi Germany to form the Greater German Reich (Grossdeutsches 
Reich), a scenario that eventually materialized when Hitler annexed Austria in the so-
called Anschluss (“link-up”) in 1938 (Stourzh 1998: 242). The issue of neutrality was 
off the table for the duration of the Second World War but was revived in the context 
of the post-war settlements. 
The Austrian State Treaty (Österreichischer Staatsvertrag) of 15 May 1955 marked 
the re-establishment of an independent and democratic Austrian state after the country 
had been under authoritarian rule from 1933. The Treaty built on the Moscow 
Memorandum of April 1955 in which the Soviet Union demanded Austria to adopt a 
neutral status based on the model of Switzerland (Steininger 2005). This condition 
was portrayed, particularly by the Soviet Union, as the only way to ensure stability in 
Central Europe in the sensitive post-war setting, where “stability” mainly meant that 
Austria would be kept from joining the transatlantic alliance. The adoption of the 
permanently neutral status was then formally enacted in the Declaration of Neutrality 
(Neutralitätserklärung) of 26 October 1955 through a constitutional act of parliament 
(Bundesverfassungsgesetz).  
It seems important to point out that, formally, Austria’s declaration of neutrality took 
place in a unilateral national procedure and out of its “own free will” (“aus freien 
Stücken”) rather than being included in the State Treaty, which had been signed by the 
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Allied occupying powers, i.e. France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the 
Soviet Union. This had important legal implications (Zielinski 1990: 45) since 
codifying Austrian neutrality in the State Treaty would have imposed the status, and it 
would have given the signatories legal power to monitor and enforce the policy. 
Therefore, at least officially, it was the sovereign decision of the newly independent 
Republic of Austria to adopt the neutral status. In view of the historical context, 
however, declaring neutrality was the only way for Austria to retain territorial 
integrity (Barz 1992). The alternative would have been for Austria to remain under 
allied rule, and eventually, to be divided into a Western and an Eastern part.  
Construction of a National Myth: the Positive Ideologization of an Old Trauma   
Losing the great power status came as a trauma to the Austrian people at the time. 
Post-war Austria was a small state with a barely viable economy depending on the 
support and favour of the world’s great powers. At no time had Austrian dependence 
been more apparent than when the Allied powers signed the State Treaty on the 
country’s behalf. It is all the more remarkable that this very moment in history was 
later reified as a formative event, a historical experience that would define Austria’s 
confident self-image for decades to come (see Gebhard 2005). What is more, instead 
of taking the adoption of neutrality as what it was, a condition imposed by the Allies, 
political leaders eventually turned neutrality into the centrepiece of Austria’s newly 
gained self-determination (Lohninger 2003), the core of a new role concept that 
would take the country “out of the shadow of the past” (Pelinka 1998). The position 
of the two major parties in this process was subject to substantial changes over time, 
particularly in the first two decades of the Second Republic. While it was first the 
conservative ÖVP to advocate the adoption of a neutral status more strongly 
throughout the 1950s, this changed in the 1960 under the auspices of ÖVP chancellors 
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Although Austria’s options were limited by great power interests, at the time, the 
adoption of the neutrality principle for the Second Republic seemed to meet the 
interests of all parties involved. For Austria, it constituted a way to re-establish its 
sovereignty and for the Soviet Union as well as for the Western powers it meant that 
Austria was not going to join any of the two blocks (Rendl 1998). The neutrality act 
was on the one hand a symbol for the conclusive loss of Austria’s great power status 
but also marked a crucial point in Austrian national identity formation. Over the next 
decades, Austrian foreign policy discourse saw the construction of a myth 
(Bruckmüller 1997; Liebhart 1998; Kernegger 2009) around Austria’s purported 
‘third way’ and the country’s disposition towards a more moral and normatively 
grounded foreign policy. 
Active and Activist Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Kreisky’s Internationalism 
Austrian foreign policy in the first years of the Second Republic was understandably 
inconsistent and confused. Austria immediately joined the United Nations (UN) and 
the Council of Europe, showing the importance that Austria as a ‘typical’ small state 
ascribed to international institutions (Hey 2003). In the context of the looming Cold 
War, Austrian leaders argued over the way the neutrality act ought to be implemented 
within the country but even more so in Austria’s external relations. Conservative 
chancellors Julius Raab (four terms in office 1953-1961 in ÖVP-SPÖ coalition 
governments), Alfons Gorbach (two terms in office 1961-1964 in ÖVP-SPÖ coalition 
governments) and Josef Klaus (one term in office 1964-1966 in ÖVP-SPÖ coalition 
government, and one term in ÖVP-government 1966-1970) were unclear in their 
position on neutrality (Der Spiegel 1962) although throughout the 1950s it had mainly 
been the conservative ÖVP to act as an advocate for neutrality (Schneider 2000). 
Against the background of the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
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in 1957 and Austrian prospects of potentially joining in the future, there was a 
tendency within the ÖVP started to employ a rather loose interpretation of the 
neutrality principle. Its effect should be limited to the military realm and not be 
extended to other policy areas (Meyer 2005). 
The same political leaders, however, seemed to be keen to cultivate the myth of the 
independent and neutral small state because of the pressure they felt from the Soviet 
Union. In addition, it would help to distance Austria from the German Federal 
Republic (BRD), and even more so, from the German Democratic Republic (DDR) 
(Gehler 1995). It would also work against the memories of Hitler’s “link-up” (Pelinka 
1990: 17) and any responsibility (complicity/Mitschuld) the Austrian people might 
have had to take in this regard. Therefore, the myth of Austria as a benevolent small 
power essentially built on the argument of Austria’s victimhood (Opferrolle). 
Bruckmüller (1995) contends that neutrality and the positive self-experience it 
entailed at the time helped Austrians to cope with both the loss of international status 
and the “unvoiced bad conscience”, which Rathkolb (2010: 3) referred to as a core 
element of Austria’s “paradoxical national identity”. To this day, the question of 
Austrian complicity in Hitler’s gruesome plan is a contentious issue, with more than 
36% of Austrians believing that Austria was a victim of Nazi-led Germany rather than 
having to share the responsibility (Mitschuld) (see e.g. Kleine Zeitung 2010). 
As Austria joined the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) in 1960, along with 
Sweden and Finland, it was then Minister of Foreign Affairs Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ, 
1959-1966) who sought to promote a new kind of neutrality policy, which he found 
should be different from the more passive one practised by Switzerland and from the 
more active approach adopted by Sweden (e.g. Höll 1994). His dedication to the issue 
marked a departure from the reluctance SPÖ leaders had shown throughout the 1950s 
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– from this point onwards, it was the SPÖ and no longer the ÖVP to actively promote 
Austria’s neutral status as the core of its international profile. The Austrian political 
culture of the following decades, particularly under later SPÖ chancellor Kreisky, saw 
the establishment of a new and increasingly confident self-image, which portrayed 
Austria as the peaceful small state with altruistic intentions, a commitment to building 
bridges (“Brückenbauer”). Austria was pictured as a haven for democratic welfare, as 
the home of confidence and sociability (“souveräne Gemütlichkeit”), and as the 
country of culture and music blessed with a certain moral and intellectual superiority 
(“moralisch-intellektuelle Überlegenheit”) (Bruckmüller 1997: 20, 24, 27). When 
Kreisky became chancellor in 1970 (in office for four consecutive terms, 1970-1983 
in SPÖ governments) he had already established a track record of active neutrality 
policy for the country. What conservative foreign minister Kurt Waldheim (1968-
1970) promoted in preceding years as “active participation in international 
cooperation” (Luif 1995: 138) had had less of a distinct focus on the international 
function of neutrality but was more linked to Waldheim’s personal experience within 
the United Nations and related aspirations for a more active role of Austria in e.g. the 
Conference on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (see 
Fischer 2008). As the figurehead of the SPÖ (see Pittler 1996), Kreisky was not only 
at the centre of the Social Democratic success story of the Second Republic, he also 
became something like the “father of the Austrian way” in international relations 
(Liebhart 1998: 38).  
Kreisky’s engagement within the Socialist International was one of the building 
blocks of his internationalist approach and active if not activist foreign policy. His 
involvement in major diplomatic actions, particularly in the Middle East peace 
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process1 and in the context of the North-South dialogue,2 contributed to the 
establishment of a distinct Austrian identity that revolved around the principle of 
“active neutrality” (“aktive Neutralitätspolitik”).3 One of the most important 
tendencies in Kreisky’s political discourse was the way he glorified neutrality and 
attempted to establish it as an essential part of the founding myth (Gründungsmythos) 
of an independent Austrian state (Gehler 2000: 725) with the aim of furthering the 
internalisation of these ideas in the national conscience. Austria’s impartiality in the 
Cold War served as a basis for what was to be perceived a distinct kind of foreign 
policy purportedly driven by a morally higher purpose. 
Under Kreisky’s rule, from the late 1960s up to the early 1980s, Austrian neutrality 
was interpreted in an extensive and comprehensive manner. Neutrality was not just 
about the responsibility to be impartial in conflicts, but there was frequent reference in 
the political discourse to the peace-time effects of the status (“Vorwirkungen zu 
Friedenszeiten”).4 The leaders of the SPÖ, in particular, promoted a conception of 
neutrality that went well beyond the limited military meaning of the term and was to 
include all parts of civic life. As mentioned before, Rathkolb (2010: 3) suggested that 
                                                 
1 Kreisky was, for example, prominently involved in the international discourse in reaction to the Jom 
Kippur War in October 1973. He openly argued for Europe to take on an active role in bringing peace 
to the Middle East. Throughout 1974-1976, he led a number of fact-finding missions to facilitate 
negotiations between Israel and various Arab states. In 1979, he was one of the first Western leaders to 
reach out to Jassir Arafat for diplomatic contact (see Secher 1994).  
2 During his terms as foreign minister and chancellor, Kreisky actively sought contact with leaders in 
the developing world. In 1981, he organized a North-South Summit in Cancun to facilitate debate 
between what were then the First and the Third World (see Rathkolb 2002). 
3 Kreisky’s offensive style in foreign policy matters, however, was interpreted by some (Pelinka and 
Rosenberger 2003) as an attitude that would endanger Austria’s impartiality rather than actually 
building on it. 
4 For a discussion on the way these peace-time effects have been reinterpreted over time, see Luif 1995 
(124-147). 
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this approach assumed traits of a “self-obsession” at times, which came inflated 
conceptions about Austria’s capacity to make a difference in world politics. 
It was in these years that Austria developed a significant peace policy. Vienna hosted 
a set of important international events (Gustenau 2002) such as the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT) 1969-1972 and the Conference for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE) in 1973. Austrian diplomat Kurt Waldheim served as UN Secretary 
General for two consecutive terms (1971-1981). Also, the headquarters of 
international organizations were established in Vienna, for example the Organization 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1965, and the UN in 1979. Under the 
conservative chancellor Raab (1953-1961) the headquarters of the International 
Atomic Energy Community (IAEA) had already been established in Vienna in 1957. 
Austria also deployed soldiers in UN peacekeeping operations, first in the Congo in 
1961, then in 1972 in Cyprus, and from 1974 until June 2013 on the Golan Heights 
bordering Syria and Israel, as part of the UN Disengagement Observer Force. This 
international engagement did bring external recognition but it also enjoyed broad 
domestic support as it “allowed the Austrian people to some extent to overlook that 
their country was no longer one of Europe’s leading powers” (Meyer 2007: 3). 
 
Austria’s Post-Cold War Peace Policy 
After Kreisky: Active but no Longer Activist 
During the mid and late 1980s when Bruno Kreisky was succeeded by SPÖ 
chancellor Fred Sinowatz (one term in office 1983-1986, SPÖ-Freedom Party/FPÖ 
coalition government) and then Franz Vranitzky (SPÖ, four terms in office 1986-
1996, one term in coalition government with FPÖ, three terms with ÖVP) Austrian 
neutrality policy became more low-key. The SPÖ retained the ministry of foreign 
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affairs until 1987 and to some extent continued an “active policy of neutrality”. 
Eventually, however, Kreisky’s commitment towards a “global foreign policy” was to 
be eclipsed (Luif 1982). 
The most important changes in this respect were introduced by Alois Mock, 
conservative Vice Chancellor (1987-1989) and Foreign Minister (1987-1995), as he 
started to bring Austria closer to the European project. In 1987, he pushed for an open 
debate about Austria’s future role in international relations. He underlined that 
Austrian foreign policy had been determined by global circumstances, i.e. the context 
of the Cold War. Any change to these circumstances as it happened would require a 
rethinking of Austria’s foreign policy principles including neutrality (Scheich 2005). 
Mock’s term in office therefore marked a period in Austrian foreign policy that was 
dominated by the attempt to normalize Austria’s status in international affairs, and to 
move away from the idea of a ‘third way’ or Austrian exceptionalism. The discourse 
on neutrality was significantly toned down as representatives of the conservative ÖVP 
seemed to prepare the public for a historical step: the formal application for accession 
to the then European Economic Community (EEC). One of the main issues in this 
regard was whether Austria’s neutral status was compatible with full membership in 
the EEC. Mock managed to diffuse concerns about the country losing its 
independence by pointing to the importance of “real” rather than “formal sovereignty” 
(Scheich 2005: 50). In a changing international environment and in the face of 
economic recession, Austria’s ability to act autonomously was intrinsically linked to 
its involvement in significant decision-making bodies, i.e. also in the EEC’s 
institutions.  
When Austria formally applied for EEC membership in 1989 there was a general 
perception among Austrians that neutrality could be retained regardless. At the 
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European level, Austria’s legacy as a neutral country was seen as a useful contribution 
to the peaceful integration of Western Europe (Luif 2003a). Moreover, Ireland had 
already set an example when it joined the EEC in 1973 retaining its status as a neutral 
and non-aligned country. At the point of application, the Austrian coalition 
government (upon the insistence of the SPÖ) included a reserve condition 
(“Neutralitätsvorbehalt”) that would allow the country to formally retain its neutral 
status regardless of any potential involvement in political integration, i.e. the so-called 
“Irish clause” (Gehler 2000: 733). However, in the Austrian case no such reserve was 
brought up during the accession talks, which took place after the Treaty on European 
Union, which included a foreign and security policy component, had become the new 
legal basis for membership. The Austrian public seemed unimpressed by this change 
as the following EU referendum in June 1994 resulted in a clear 66.6% in favour of 
accession. When Austria, Sweden and Finland joined the EU they indeed signed an 
additional protocol to declare that they would pursue European policies without any 
reservations that might arise from their foreign policy status (Schneider 1999).  
European Union Membership and Transatlantic Integration 
When Austria became a member in 1995, the EEC had developed into a political 
union, which included a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Although the 
security and defence component of the CFSP did not materialize until the early 2000s, 
Austria had subscribed to all parts of the policy, which according to Title V of the 
Treaty of Maastricht of 1993 (Treaty in European Union, Maastricht) foresaw the 
creation of a common security and defence policy if the Council so decided. In 1994, 
shortly before Austria joined the EU, a special provision was added to the Austrian 
Federal Constitution (article 23f) to make sure that Austrian participation would not 
clash with legal responsibilities related to the Neutrality Act of 1955 
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(Bundesgesetzblatt 1994). This meant a clear change of direction in Austria’s foreign 
policy: neutrality was formally reduced to the core of military impartiality, whereas 
Austria’s contribution to European integration constituted the new building block of 
its new peace policy. Although neutrality was still an essential element in Austrian 
national identity, public interest in these changes remained limited, particularly as the 
discourse within the EU still highlighted similar themes, such as solidarity and 
civilian security. 
Austria also joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) and its Planning and 
Review Process (PARP) in 1995, alongside Finland and Sweden, without any major 
domestic controversy. The international context of NATO revising its strategic 
outlook and self-image in view of the new global circumstances after the end of the 
Cold War certainly helped to diffuse concerns that PfP-membership could endanger 
Austria’s independence. If at all, the PfP Programme was publicly debated as a 
platform for technical cooperation and development with minor political implications. 
Any option of joining the alliance as a full member, however, continued to be ruled 
out. Moreover, in 1996, Austria was one of the founding members of the UN 
Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade of UN Operations (SHIRBRIG) and 
has since contributed to SHIRBRIG with a contingent consisting of a transportation 
company as well as taking over its presidency in 2004.5  
Austria’s early years as a member in the EU and full contributor to the EU’s CFSP 
were in no way compromised by the neutrality issue. The discourse at the 
international and European level in fact moved away from Austria’s special status 
altogether. Instead, political leaders, and most of all representatives of the ÖVP, 
seemed keen to underline their new focus on the principle of solidarity, and to 
                                                 
5 The brigade ceased operational business in June 2009.  
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signalise that Austria was not going to obstruct any steps towards further European 
integration (Schneider 1999). The EU’s security and defence policy, and the military 
capability development process were eventually brought underway during the 
Austrian Council Presidency in the second half of 1998. 
The foreign minister to succeed Mock in 1995, Wolfgang Schüssel (ÖVP), was one of 
the central figures in the new domestic debate about the changing importance of 
neutrality for Austria’s role in the world. While at the beginning of Austria’s EU 
membership he was still moderate in his views about the compatibility of neutrality 
with European integration, his perspective changed dramatically over time. In public 
statements he started to picture permanent neutrality as a status that had been imposed 
upon Austria in a very specific historical context, namely in return for the withdrawal 
of post-war Soviet occupation forces. Schüssel openly declared that neutrality would 
no longer make sense in the complex circumstances of the 21st century (Nationalrat 
2002). President Thomas Klestil (1992-2004) in turn adopted a moderate position, 
which did not openly challenge Schüssel’s basic argument but highlighted that 
formally speaking the Austrian parliament had adopted neutrality out of its own will. 
He also stressed that any changes to the existing status of Austria would need to be 
approved by the Austrian population. However, Klestil (1994) himself also suggested 
that Austria’s neutrality policy would need to be reinterpreted as international 
circumstances had changed. He underlined that neutrality had never been an end in 
itself and that securing the country’s interest should be the foremost priority of any 
approach to international engagement (Schneider 1999). 
Outlining Schüssel’s evolution during these years, Pelinka (1998: 172) pointed out 
that the argumentative challenge for politicians was enormous: “Now the elites had to 
undo the belief they had worked on long and hard to install in the Austrian people”. 
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Finding common ground in the face of this challenge, and agreeing on a joint course 
for a new Austrian foreign policy after the end of the Cold War and in the new 
European context, turned out to be impossible for the two governing parties, the SPÖ 
with chancellor Viktor Klima (1997-2000) and the ÖVP with Vice Chancellor and 
Foreign Minister Schüssel. In 2000, internal divisions over this issue along with 
fundamental disagreements over economic and social policy ended the phase of grand 
coalition governments (1987-2000) as well as social democratic prevalence. After the 
general elections in 1999, SPÖ and ÖVP failed to build another coalition government, 
so that Schüssel turned to a coalition with the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ), which 
had won a landslide victory equalling the ÖVP at 26.9% in the parliamentary 
elections. The emerging ÖVP-FPÖ government was the first centre-right coalition in 
the history of the Second Republic – a systemic change, which had fundamental 
implications for Austria’s foreign policy. 
The Conservative Turn in 1999 
At the European level this ‘conservative turn’, i.e. the inclusion of Jörg Haider’s FPÖ 
in the government, was seen as a threat to liberal democracy, which is why the then 
EU-14 decided to impose diplomatic sanctions on Austria. At a time ÖVP chief 
Schüssel wanted to see his country as an integral part of the European integration 
project, Austria found itself more isolated than ever since the establishment of the 
Second Republic. Although the sanctions were eventually lifted, a bad aftertaste 
remained.6 In the following months, Schüssel’s ÖVP advocated a strong pro-
European stance for his country, underlining the principle of intra-European 
solidarity. No longer restricted by normative concerns of the former coalition partner 
                                                 
6 Some argue (e.g. Luif 2010) that Austria struggles to this day to find allies within the European 
Union. 
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SPÖ, now Chancellor Schüssel (2000-2006) adopted a clear yet rather drastic 
approach to the issue of neutrality and Austrian exceptionalism. In a number of public 
appearances he emphasized that the circumstances under which neutrality had been 
deemed necessary or useful in the past had ceased to exist with the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War. In fact, since Austria had become a member of 
the EU “it had no longer been capable of being neutral in practice anyway. […] We 
will have to finally tell people the truth” (Nationalrat 2002). It was also Schüssel who 
in a speech to the National Assembly on the 46th anniversary of the Austrian 
Neutrality Act (26 October 2001, National Holiday) explained Austrian emotional and 
ideological attachment to neutrality as similar to the one to “Lipizzaner” and 
“Mozartkugeln”,7 which had also lost much of their normative importance but would 
continue to exist in people’s minds (Nationalrat 2002). Aware of public support for 
neutrality (see e.g. Reinprecht and Latcheva 2003: 443), however, he added that the 
core of the policy would be retained: Austria would still not fight wars, host any 
foreign troops on its territory or become a member of any military alliance. In 2001, 
the National Assembly adopted a new Security and Defence Doctrine 
(Österreichische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsdoktrin 2001) after the last Defence 
Plan had dated from 1983 and was based on the Defence Doctrine of 1975. The new 
document also suggested that Austrian neutrality had de facto changed in the course 
of EU accession, and that the status was now rather “non-aligned” (“bündnisfrei”), 
which reflected a narrative that Sweden (“alliansfri”) and Finland 
(“sitoutumattomat“) had taken on already in the early 1990s in view of EU accession. 
‘Neutrality’ was to be replaced with ‘solidarity’. The document also contained strong 
                                                 
7 “Lipizzaner” are a breed of horse, which is closely associated with the Spanish Riding School 
(Hofreitschule) in Vienna. “Mozartkugeln” is a confectionary, which has for a long time been 
exclusively produced in Salzburg.  
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references to the objectives of the EU’s foreign and security policy, suggesting i.a. 
that Austrian security could no longer be seen in isolation from the EU context 
(Hauser 2007). In other words, neutrality had been dismantled insofar as Austria’s 
foreign policy would no longer differ from that of other member states.  
In 1999 Meanwhile, the government also started a major reform of the Armed Forces 
in line with the capability development processes Austria absolved in the context of 
NATO’s PARP and the EU’s Capability Action Plan (ECAP). Austria’s involvement 
in these developments was at no point compromised by reservations concerning the 
continued status of formal neutrality. Meanwhile, the reform was as much a strategic 
decision in view of new global circumstances as a political and financial necessity: 
the only constraints for Austria’s Armed Forces in this regard seem to have been the 
obvious budgetary limitations (with a general defence budget of less than 0.9% of the 
GDP), and the relative pressure to be interoperable within the EU and NATO-PfP 
frameworks.  
When the EU’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) became 
operational with the launch of the military operation ‘Concordia’ in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in March 2003, Austria contributed with a 
contingent, along with other formerly neutral member states such as Sweden, as well 
as France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. In the years to follow, Austria 
became one of the top-10 ESDP contributors with consistent contributions of up to 
5% (SIPRI 2012).8 The largest and most extensive involvement of Austrian forces in 
                                                 
8 Other countries in this top-10 list are France, Italy, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, the 
Netherlands, (Austria) Hungary and Portugal, which shows that Austria’s contribution is remarkable 
for a state of its size and capabilities.  
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an EU operation has so far been in the context of EUFOR ‘Althea’ in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina with approximately 360 troops at a time (since 2004).9  
 
Recent developments 
Since the end of the centre-right coalition in 2006 and the return to power of an SPÖ-
led coalition with the ÖVP, Austria has moved further away from its exceptionalism. 
Even under the social democratic chancellor Gusenbauer (SPÖ), neutrality and the 
myth of Austria’s ‘third way’ did not see its revival. Austria has since continued its 
path towards a normalized and inconspicuous national role conception, and has 
pursued a policy of ‘pragmatic neutrality’, albeit without turning into a free rider. The 
Austrian Security Strategy (Österreichische Sicherheitsstrategie 2011) has by now 
fully endorsed the EU approach to contemporary challenges as it was laid down in the 
European Security Strategy in 2003 although it is still awaiting ratification. 
Austrian forces have been deployed in most civilian and military CSDP missions and 
some NATO-led operations over the past years. These contributions seemed to be 
more restricted by material shortfalls and budgetary restraints than by political 
reservations. Critical voices have repeatedly pointed at Austria’s reluctance to deploy 
forces in more robust operations such as in Afghanistan where Austrian contributions 
have been limited. Crucial in this debate have been internal documents of the US 
embassy in Vienna, which were made public by Wikileaks in late 2010 (Cable 
10STATE17263). These documents criticised Austrian leaders, and Minister of 
Defence Norbert Darabos in particular, for being “openly hostile” to committing 
                                                 
9 Since 1999, Austria has contributed even larger contingents of up to 500 troops to the NATO-led 
KFOR in Kosovo. Since 1974, Austria has also held a contingent of up to 370 troops with UNDOF on 
the Golan Heights (Syria/Israel). 
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troops to dangerous operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq (Presse 2010). While 
Austrian contributions in these cases have indeed been limited, there has generally 
been a clear move away from traditional limitations in the scope of operational 
engagements. This was not least marked by the Austrian participation in the (then) 
EU-led civil-military operation in Chad (2008-2009), which was both unpopular and 
militarily challenging. 
While during the Cold War any international engagement of Austrian forces was to be 
limited to non-controversial types of missions such as UN peacekeeping operations 
and monitoring, Austria is now more ready to deliver across the whole spectrum of 
Petersberg Tasks.10 Austria also contributes to a multi-national Battle Group along 
with Germany, the Czech Republic, Croatia and Macedonia. Most recently, in Spring 
2012, the Austrian contingent at UNDOF, which has been stationed on the Golan 
Heights since 1974, saw a dramatic change of operational and strategic circumstances. 
As the civil war in Syria unfolds, UN forces stationed near the border are expected to 
“interpret their mandate more extensively”, i.e. including the use of weapons to 
enforce UN law. In the past, the Austrian government would have considered 
withdrawing its troops to prevent them from getting involved in fighting. This time, 
however, acting defence minister Darabos (SPÖ) is simply expressing “concerns” 
while the Austrian commander orders “business as usual” (Kurier 2012). 
In the context of recent treaty revisions, and the incremental extension of the remit of 
the EU’s CFSP and CSDP, Austria has refrained from claiming any sort of special 
treatment. While drawing up a new framework for the EU’s CSDP operations as well 
as for the internal and external dimensions of its general security policy, the Reform 
Treaty of 2009 foresaw both a solidarity clause (“Solidaritätsklausel”, art. 222 TFEU), 
                                                 
10 Petersberg tasks also include more robust scenarios, such as peacemaking and the separation of 
parties by force. 
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and a mutual military assistance clause (“Beistandsverpflichtung”, art. 42 TEU) (see 
Schilchegger 2011). The treaty thus contained a number of legal provisions that 
further reduced the substance of Austria’s neutral status, although these came with a 
number of caveats that left the question what an assistance or solidarity call would 
practically entail for Austria, relatively open. It is important to point out, however, 
that these provisions came with a number of caveats. The section on the Common 
Security and Defence Policy (art, 42 TEU) i.a. highlights that the policy of the Union 
“shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States” (art. 42(2)). This so-called “Irish clause” has traditionally served as a 
safeguard for neutral member states to ensure their participation in EU policies does 
not interfere with legal obligations arising from their status. Legal experts have been 
divided as to whether this would mean that neutrals would as a result be bound by a 
kind of “asymmetric” assistance clause, which would only come with benefits for 
these states but with no responsibilities. Others have highlighted that art. 42(7) on the 
military assistance clause would have had to repeat this safeguard whereas it only 
mentions member state obligations towards NATO in this context. Hilpold (2010) 
summarizes the legal debate by suggesting that any specific commitment or even 
involvement of Austria would be decided on a case-by-case basis. What seems 
crucial, in any case, is that regardless of these novel legal implications the neutrality 
principle has been formally retained to this day.  
According to several public opinion polls conducted in the past decade, Austrian 
citizens consider neutrality an essential part of their national identity. Today, 
however, Austrian neutrality is reduced to its core meaning, i.e. no membership in any 
military alliance (i.e. NATO) and no stationing of foreign troops on Austrian territory. 
Any additional meaning and normative effect that neutrality was ascribed during the 
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Cold War has been replaced by a policy of active but not activist engagement within 
the EU and NATO’s PfP. Full-NATO membership has so far still not been envisaged, 
not least because public support for such a step is limited (Reinprecht and Latcheva 
2003: 446-447). According to opinion polls held during the past decade more than 
75% of Austrians would not approve of formally giving up neutrality, which is what 
NATO-accession would entail. The ideological and societal costs of such a step are 
higher than the relative gains as Austria is already fully associated in the transatlantic 
context of the PfP. A majority of the Austrian population is also in favour of common 
European security and defence arrangements including the capability improvement 
processes coordinated through NATO’s PARP, although overall support for the EU 
has been consistently low among the Austrian people. 
 
Conclusion: Not a Natural Born Peacemaker 
This article set out to explore in what way Austria has followed a typical small state 
approach in its foreign policy, and to what extent the end of the Cold War as well as 
Austria’s involvement in transatlantic and EU security and defence arrangements have 
had an impact on the country’s national role conception. In the context of bipolar 
confrontation, Austrian leaders, and foremost the Social Democrat Bruno Kreisky, 
actively sought to establish a global reputation for their country as a benevolent 
mediator, and purportedly, a ‘natural born’ peace maker. Much of this normative 
image built on Austria’s neutrality, which allowed the country to promote an 
alternative ‘third way’ in its foreign policy. Kreisky’s diplomatic activism during the 
1970s and 1980s helped the country to assert itself on the global stage despite its 
relative lack of resources and leverage.  
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Today, much of the discourse about the normative orientation of Austrian foreign and 
security policy has been retained, but policies and the underlying constitutional law 
have gradually changed in substance. Austria’s accession to the EU and its 
contribution to the CSDP have normalized the country’s international profile. Even if 
Austria has so far refrained from abandoning its neutral status altogether by e.g. 
entering NATO as a full member, the country is externally perceived as part of the EU 
and thus as part of an alliance that is based on mutual solidarity.  
Over the last decade, the EU has become more involved in all policy areas, and the 
implications of membership are far more comprehensive than they were at the time 
Austria entered the Union in 1995. Austria, regardless of which parties constituted its 
government, has established itself as a proactive EU member state that consistently 
pushes for closer cooperation in all policy areas including sensitive policies like 
security and defence. Geostrategic circumstances after the end of the Cold War have 
exposed neutral countries like Austria to a new set of challenges, which could not be 
addressed by military or hard power alone. Contemporary threats such as organised 
crime, religious fundamentalism and transnational terrorism do not lie within the 
remit of an active neutrality policy. Potential attacks are no longer directed against 
states with certain international positions but against Western civilization as a whole. 
This includes neutral states as much as any one of the great powers with offensive 
foreign and security policy traditions. Moreover, globalization has deprived Austria of 
the option to argue for a special status as a proponent of the third way or as a natural 
born peace maker, and finding partners and political allies in Europe has proven 
difficult as well. 
Finally, this article also set out to explore whether Austria has got a special 
disposition towards peaceful means in international relations, i.e. whether it has been 
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a ‘natural born’ peace maker. In answering this question, this article sought a middle 
ground between realist and constructivist explanations of small state behaviour in 
international affairs. The conclusion here is that Austria has in fact never been a 
natural born peace maker. As has been reflected in the level of moral inflation and 
self-obsession over Austrian exceptionality during the Cold War, it was not really a 
natural decision of the country to be “small and beautiful”. Adopting a sort of non-
offensive but active (and activist) foreign policy during the Cold War was more of a 
strategic decision than a normative one. Reduced to a small state, and in the shadow 
of the all-pervasive block confrontation, there was very limited leeway for an 
autonomous foreign policy profile. Austrian leaders, however, successfully 
established an image of Austria as an ideal partner and mediator in conflict situations.  
As soon as systemic circumstances allowed for fundamental changes, leaders moved 
away from the idea of a ‘third way’, which proves to an extent that the peace policy 
had been a mere strategy to survive. Austria’s peace policy, however, was more than 
just a product of historical circumstances as a structuralist perspective would suggest. 
As this article has shown, Austrian leaders constructed a specific image for Austria to 
be able to make the most out of its relatively weak position at the time.  
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